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Aboriginal Legal Aid Funding: Discriminatory 
Policy or a Failure of Federalism? 
 
By Jane Robbins. 
 
The ALRM Complaint to the UN 
In September 2008, the Aboriginal Legal Rights Movement (‘ALRM’), the contracted 
Aboriginal Legal Aid service provider in South Australia (‘SA’), submitted a 
complaint to both the UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination and 
to the Special Rapporteur on the Situation of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms of Indigenous Peoples, James Anaya. The substance of ALRM’s 
submission is that inadequate funding of Aboriginal legal aid services by State 
Government and Commonwealth Government is discriminatory in effect, and 
constitutes a breach of Article 2 of the International Convention on the Elimination of 
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (‘CERD’). 
 
The complaint makes a case that Government funding for ALRM’s Aboriginal legal 
aid services is inadequate. It also emphasises the differential treatment by State and 
Federal Government of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Legal Services 
(‘ATSILS’), such as ALRM, compared to Legal Aid Commissions (‘LACs’), which 
provide mainstream legal aid services. Some of the main points made in the complaint 
are: 
 
• Commonwealth Government funding for Aboriginal legal aid has been static 
since 1996. This amounts to a 40% loss of income to ALRM 40% in real 
terms; 
• Over this period, the level of demand for ALRM services has increased by 
100%; 
• In the same period, funding for mainstream LACs has increased by 120%; 
• The rate of imprisonment of Aboriginal people has continued to rise during 
this period; 
• The SA Government does not contribute to ALRM funding; in contrast, it 
contributes funding to LAC services on a dollar for dollar basis; 
• The inadequate funding provided to ALRM prevents it from fulfilling its 
mandate. Because ALRM cannot provide effective support to many clients, 
many Aboriginal people are denied equitable acess to jusitce; and 
• Unlike LAC services, ATSILS contracts have been tendered out.1 
 
ALRM is not alone in facing a funding crisis; this is a problem reported by ATSILS 
nation-wide. But neither State nor Federal Government can claim to be unaware of 
this situation. In recent years, several inquiries have examined these issues and 
concluded that the funding of ATSILS is a serious problem that must be addressed by 
Government.2  
 
The Inadequacy of ATSILS Funding  
The ability of ATSILS such as ALRM to provide effective legal support to 
Indigenous clients is a matter that is all the more urgent in the context of the 
disproportionate number of Indigenous people in the Australian criminal justice 
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system. In 2007, the Steering Committee for the Review of Government Service 
Provision  published the following statistics: 
 
• between 2000 and 2006 Indigenous imprisonment rates increased by 31.9%;  
• between 2002 and 2006 the imprisonment rate increased by 34% for 
Indigenous women and by 21.6% for Indigenous men; 
• in 2006, Indigenous people were 12.9 times more likely than non-Indigenous 
Australians to be imprisoned (age-adjusted).3 
 
Research indicates that a higher percentage of Indigenous offenders are given 
custodial sentences compared with non-Indigenous offenders as a result of ‘a higher 
rate of conviction for violent crime and higher rate of re-offending’.4 It has also been 
shown that ATSILS are ‘the legal aid body of choice’ for most Indigenous legal aid. 
In 2000-2001, 89% of Indigenous legal aid cases were taken on by ATSILS; only 
11% were taken on by LACs.5 Under these circumstances, ATSILS face a situation 
where their resources are static, yet their client group is increasing in number. Further, 
ATSILS require support to provide services for a higher than average proportion of 
serious offences. Reflecting on this, Cunneen and Schwartz have commented that the 
‘significant lack of parity’ between ATSILS and LAC funding has ‘severe 
ramifications.’6  
  
According to ALRM CEO, Neil Gillespie, insufficient resources directly impact upon 
ALRM operations. He refers to ‘juniorisation’ of staff, a practice of replacing senior 
staff with junior staff to cope with inadequate funding.7 This leads to a situation 
where the ALRM has few senior, experienced legal officers to deal with what are 
often quite serious cases. The notable disparity in employee salaries between ATSILS 
and LACs was reported by the Joint Committee of Public Accounts and Audit 
(‘JCPA’) in its 2005 Report Access of Indigenous Australians to Law and Justice 
Services.8 Similarly, the Australian National Audit Office  reported in 2003 that  
 
there is a flow of staff from the ATSILS to the LACs because of substantial variation 
in pay rates.9  
 
It has been shown that, despite lower levels of pay, ATSILS lawyers have higher 
workloads.10 The lack of funding impacts on other areas of practice: in a 2003 
submission to the Senate Legal and Constitutional References Committee, ALRM 
expressed concern about its capacity to ‘offer adequate rates for private lawyers’, 
revealing that it was only able to pay a fee 11% lower than paid by the Legal Services 
Commission.11 This was seen as compromising ALRM’s ability to provide a quality 
service to clients. The organisation is limited in its capacity to supplement its own 
legal expertise with that of private practitioners who are brought in for special 
purposes. This disparity in funding adds up to a situation where ATSILS ‘provides a 
cheap form of legal representation for Indigenous people’.12 
 
A Federal Dispute? 
In the complaint to the UN, ALRM makes a strong case that the SA Government’s 
failure to contribute funding is a major factor in its financial difficulties. According to 
Mr Gillespie, this is a federal dispute over funding responsibilities. The 
Commonwealth Government sees its role as that of a ‘supplementary funder’, with the 
main responsibility falling to state governments. This view was confirmed by the 
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Attorney General’s submission to the JCPAA Inquiry in 2005. 13 The SA State 
Government, on the other hand, provides funding for mainstream legal aid; it regards 
Aboriginal legal aid as a special program that rests in the Commonwealth’s 
jurisdiction.14 Gillespie writes: 
 
This standoff or demarcation dispute is having a dramatic effect on Aboriginal 
people accessing justice in our State. I understand other State and Territory 
Governments are in the same position. This is effectively two Governments at 
loggerheads as to responsibility to Aboriginal people. 15 
 
 
It is the distinction in treatment between Aboriginal and mainstream legal aid funding 
that forms one of the most pressing arguments in the ALRM claim of racial 
discrimination. The differential treatment carries over into other aspects of ALRM’s 
relationship with the SA court system: while other legal aid providers are exempted 
from court filing and transcription fees, ALRM is required to pay these costs. 16 This 
is so even though most of ALRM’s work involves defending SA clients, in SA courts, 
regarding breaches of SA State law.17 
 
The deleterious consequences of this federal tension for ATSILS are clear. This raises 
the question: what steps has the Commonwealth Government taken to negotiate a 
better outcome with state governments? As the Law Society of SA submitted to the 
JCPAA:  
 
It is hardly for the ATSILS or the Law Society to be doing these high-powered 
political manoeuvres as between the Commonwealth and states on what is essentially 
a federal issue.18  
 
According to the Attorney General’s Department in 2005, the Commonwealth has not 
approached state governments on this matter. 19 
 
State/Commonwealth Responsibilities  
How has this situation come about? Section 51(xxvi) of the Australian Constitution 
originally gave the Commonwealth parliament responsibility for making laws for:  
 
[t]he people of any race, other than the aboriginal race in any State, for whom it is 
deemed necessary to make special laws.  
 
This meant that Aboriginal policy was an exclusive State power. As a consequence of 
the 1967 referendum, the words ‘other than the aboriginal race in any State’ were 
struck out. The success of the referendum meant that the only reference to Aboriginal 
people was deleted from the Australian Constitution; yet what is often referred to as 
the Commonwealth ‘race power’ was retained. Now, as a result, Indigenous affairs 
policy is a concurrent area of activity, requiring negotiations to take place to allocate 
responsibilities between State and Federal Government. 
 
The Whitlam Labor Government of 1972-5 was the first to embark on a large-scale 
expansion of the Commonwealth’s role in funding Aboriginal programs. The 
Aboriginal Affairs (Arrangements with the States) Act 1973 authorised the 
Commonwealth to make an agreement on Aboriginal affairs with each State. 20 The 
agreement struck with the SA Government expressly preserved  
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the existing right of the South Australian Government to implement measures to meet 
the special needs of the Aboriginal people in the ordinary course of the provision of 
services.21  
 
This provision was typical of the agreements negotiated with other states. However, in 
the Fraser era, an attempt was made to make the delineation of responsibilities more 
precise and to clarify states’ financial responsibilities.22 It was agreed that state 
governments would provide ordinary services to Aboriginal people as they would for 
non-Aboriginal citizens of the state. The Commonwealth would provide for the 
‘special needs’ of Aboriginal people in relation to ‘the particular or severe 
disadvantage due to Aboriginality’. 23 This essentially vague allocation of 
responsibility that underlies the assertion that the Commonwealth is only expected to 
provide ‘supplementary’ funding for Aboriginal programs. This has always proved 
unsatisfactory as a working principle and the problem persists today. Despite the 
negotiation of many subsequent State/Commonwealth agreements, and a commitment 
from all levels of government to a National Framework of Principles for Government 
Service Delivery to Indigenous Australians in 2004,24 tensions and ambiguities 
remain characteristic of the federal relationship on Aboriginal policy. 
 
The Commonwealth Grant Commission considered the tensions inherent in areas of 
shared federal responsibility in its 2001 Report on Indigenous Funding. It argued that 
‘Australia’s federal system of government blurs service delivery responsibility’ and 
results in ‘some responsibility and cost shifting between governments’. 25 A further 
point is directly pertinent to the case of Aboriginal legal aid funding:  
 
[t]he failure of mainstream programs to effectively address the needs of 
Indigenous people means that, in practice, Indigenous-specific programs are 
being expected to do more than they are designed and funded to achieve. 26  
 
Federal States and International Obligations  
Australia’s federal system of government poses some difficulty in relation to 
compliance with obligations under international instruments, notwithstanding the 
Commonwealth’s unequivocal powers on external affairs in the Australian 
Constitution. It is the Commonwealth Government that is a signatory to international 
agreements and treaties, but this does not necessarily mean that it administers the 
relevant policy field domestically. In practice, the complex and multi- faceted 
relationships between Commonwealth, State and Territory Governments make the 
political dimensions of the federal relationship as important as the legal arrangements. 
The Commonwealth Government does not always have unambiguous control over a 
given policy issue. 
 
ALRM’s complaint to the UN regarding chronic under-funding is illustrative of this 
problem. Certainly, the Commonwealth Government’s failure to index or increase 
ATSIL funding over the last decade is a matter that raises the question of its 
obligations under CERD. However, the Commonwealth has no direct control over 
State funding of Aboriginal legal aid services. States are not signatories to CERD in 
their own right – so can they be nominated in a complaint? Past decisions by the 
CERD Committee of the UN indicate that federal arrangements do not abrogate 
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responsibility for international obligations. In 2000 the Committee issued the 
following comment in relation to another question on Australia’s obligations:  
 
The Committee reiterates its recommendation that the Commonwealth 
Government should undertake appropriate measures to ensure the consistent 
application of the provisions of the Convention, in accordance with article 27 
of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, at all levels of government, 
including states and territories, and if necessary by calling on its power to 
override territory laws and using its external affairs power with regard to state 
laws.27 
  
In other words, it is the Commonwealth Government’s responsibility to ensure that 
states comply with the standards of non-discriminatory behaviour laid down in 
CERD. Ultimately, the Commonwealth has the constitutional authority to coerce 
states to comply with international obligations under its external affairs power, but 
this may be politically controversial. In 2001, the Commonwealth Grants Commission 
suggested that the Commonwealth should utilise its financial resources to encourage 
states to consider the needs of Indigenous people as a priority in service delivery. An 
obvious strategy would be to increase the use of tied grants or special purpose 
payments which place conditions on the states.  
 
ALRM’s case to the CERD Committee draws attention to a significant problem in 
Australia’s federal arrangements. Aboriginal programs are too often subjected to cost-
shifting and disputes between agencies about funding obligations as a result of 
concurrent responsibilities of between levels of government. The CERD Committee 
now has the opportunity to comment on whether these tensions have impacted upon 
the provision of Aboriginal legal services in a way that is racially discriminatory, and 
whether they constitute a breach of Australia’s international obligations under CERD. 
As Cunneen and Schwartz comment:  
 
[t]he issue of the adequacy of legal representation for Indigenous people goes to the 
heart of questions of access, equity and the rule of law.28  
 
Jane Robbins is a Senior Lecturer in the School of Political and International Studies and 
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